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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT I. COHNE, for and on 
behalf of himself and all stock-
holders of RELIANCE 
NATIONAL LIFE 
I)J"SURANCE COMPANY, 
sirnilady situated, 
Plointiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FRANK B. SALISBURY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
TIOBERT I. COHNE, for and on 
behalf of RELIANCE 
~ATIONAL LIFE 
I~SURANCE COMPANY, 
Pluintif f and Appellant, 
vs. 
FRANK B. SALISBURY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
10814 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Robert I. Cohne, on his own be-
half and purporting to act for stockholders of Reli-
ance National Life Insurance Co., appeals from a 
judgment of the District Court of Salt Lake County 
dismissing appellant's complaint against respondent 
on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a 
1 
claim for relief, appellant had waived his claim, 
and the action was res judicata. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant filed a complaint in two counts ir 
the District Court, Salt Lake County on August 8, 
1966. A demand for non-resident security was made 
by the respondent and posted. The respondent filed 
a motion to dismiss and memorandums were submit-
ted to the trial court. On 28 December, 1966, the 
Honorable Merrill C. Faux entered judgment dis-
missing the appellant's complaint on the basis noted 
above. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the decision of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant's complaint alleged that Reliance 
National Life Insurance Company was a Utah cor-
poration doing business in several western states 
and was merged as a result of some actions of re-
spondent with \Vestern Life Insurance Company 
( R. 1) . The action of plain tiff was purportedly 
brought on behalf of the stockholders of Reliance 
(R. 2), under Rule 23(a) URCP. 
The complaint recited that there were three 
classes of Reliance stock; Class A, voting; Class AA 
non-voting; and Class B, non-voting (R. 2). It fur-
2 
the1· alleged that respondent had been the promoter 
of Reliance, president, executive managing officer, 
and a director ( R. 2). It was alleged that he owned 
30, 068 shares of Class A voting stock which was 
76.5 <i( of all the outstanding voting stock of Re-
liance ( R. 3). It was alleged that respondent in 
February, 1964, entered into an agreement to sell 
his stock for $60.00 per share to a Delaware cor-
poration known as Financial Investors Corporation 
( R. 3) . The stock of Reliance was being traded at 
from $26 to $30 per share at the time. As a result 
of the sale Financial Investors took over control of 
Reliance ( R. 4). It was alleged that thereafter 
Financial Investors sold its stock to National West-
ern which merged with Reliance (R. 4). At the 
time of the merger appellant alleged that the stock-
holders of Reliance received $15 per share and at 
the time of suit the market value of the representa-
tive shares was $7.00 (R. 5). The ~ppellant con-
tended he was entitled to recover the difference be-
tween the $60.00 per share paid the respondent and 
the $30.00 per share market value at the time of 
sale ( R. 5). This was apparently on the theory of 
premium of control. Costs and attorney's fees were 
also sought. 
Count Two alleged the same general facts but 
sought to maintain the action under Rule 25 (b) 
URCP. The appellant sought judgment in the 
amount of $902,040 plus attorneys fees, costs, etc. 
(R. 7). 
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The motion to dismiss filed by the respondent 
contended the complaint failed to state a claim for 
relief, was res judicata based on a prior federal 
action between the parties, and that the appellants 
were estoppecl to claim relief ( R. 38) . 
At the time of hearing on the motion several 
exhibits were received into evidence including a 
complaint, amended complaint, memorandum deci-
sion and judgment in Civil No. C 170-65, Robert 
I. Cohne, et al., vs. Frank B. Salsbury, et al., on an 
action in the United States District Court, District 
of Utah. The \'a1·ious papers filed in the federal 
action are designated Exhibit D-1 in the instant 
case. The original complaint filed by appellant in 
federal court named in addition to respondent, Na-
tional "\Vestern Life, Financial Investors, and Ro-
bert L. Moody, as party defendants. The factual al-
legations as against the respondent Salisbury cov-
ered the same transaction as is complained of in the 
instant case (Exhibit D-1, Complaint pp. 1-8). The 
appellant purported to base his cause of action on 
Section 10 ( b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (15 USC 78) and Rule lO(b)-5 (17 CFR 
240.106-5) promulgated by the Commission. An 
amended complaint was thereafter filed again al-
leging the same facts as appellant claims support 
the instant case as well as several other allegations. 
A legal conclusion that the transactions complained 
were "induced by fraud and misrepresentation" in 
violation of 10 (b )-5 were made. Claim was also 
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made for recovery unde1· the pendent jurisdiction 
of the federal court on any common law or state 
claim that may be raised by the facts (Exhibit 
D-1), Amended Complaint p. 5). However, on 
March 7, 1966, the appellant, who had initially in-
\·oked the fede1·al court's pendent jurisdiction, ex-
pressly waived any pendent claims and that portion 
of the complaint was stricken (See Amended Com-
plaint, Exhibit D-1, p. 5). 
A motion to dismiss was filed in the federal 
action and after prolonged consideration by the trial 
court on 6 July, 1966, Judge A. Sherman Christen-
sen en te1·ed a memorandum decision which recited: 
'·I have concluded, in view of the cases 
cited by counsel in the briefs and in reason-
able interpretation of the statute, that there 
can be no recovery under the allegations of 
the complaint of a premium on profits from 
a sale of control; that a sufficient 10 (b) 
claim is not stated; that there is no reliance 
shown by any purchaser or sel}er of any se-
curity or in connection with a purchase or 
sale; that the merger as pleaded is not a sale, 
nor was it effected in connection with a sale 
of securities within the contemplation of the 
statute, and that the theory of fraud in con-
nection with proxy solicitations does not sus-
tain plaintiff's claims as stated." 
On September 22, 1966, Judge Christensen en-
tered judgment dismissing the appellant's com-
plaint. The judgment (Exhibit D-1) recited: 
"That plaintiff's Amended Complaint 
and the above entitled action and all claims 
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for relief asserted therein be and the same 
hereby are dismissed on the grounds and for 
the reasons that plaintiff's Amended Com-
plaint fails to state facts upon which the re-
lief demanded can be granted and this Court 
is without jurisdiction on the subject matter 
set for th therein, all in accordance with the 
Memorandum Decision heretofore made and 
entered herein." 
It should be observed that the court dismissed 
both on grounds of failure to state a claim for relief 
and lack of jurisdiction. 
Appellant thereafter took an appeal to the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals but subsequently 
dismissed his appeal. 
The instant action was dismissed by the trial 
court on three grounds: ( 1) failure to state a claim 
for relief, ( 2) voluntary waiver of his claim in fed-
eral court precluding his state action, and ( 3) res 
judicata. It is submitted that each of these reasons 
provided a correct basis for dismissal. The brief of 
appellant contains some points that are apparently 
directed to the basis of the trial court's decision but 
they are so vaguely articulated that the respondent 
will meet the appellant's brief on the basis of the 
trial court's decision. 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT'S C 0 M P L A I N T FAILS TO 
STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF CAN 
BE GRANTED. 
The trial court dismissed the appellant's action 
on the ground that the complaint fails to state a 
6 
claim for i·elief. The appellant spent little attention 
in his brief on this issue. It is obvious that in this 
case the concept of a cause of action for the sale of 
control and the receipt of a premium for such a 
sale is not applicable. 
The essence of the claims of appellant is that 
the i·esponclent obtained a premium for sale of his 
stock ( 76.5 ~ ~ ) which should have been given to the 
rnino1·ity shareholders. It should be noted that there 
is no allegation that as a result of the sale to In-
n·stors and the merger with National Western that 
the corporation (National Western) has milked off 
the asses ts of National Reliance or fraudulently 
clealt with the former shareholders of National Re-
liance. At best, the pleading of the appellant asserts 
that respondent received a premium which other 
minority shareholders did not receive, that the sale 
was consummated without their knowledge, and fin-
ally that a merger occurred resulting in a reduction 
in the market value of the National Reliance stock. 
These facts simply do not state a claim for relief. 
It is a generally recognized rule that a share-
holcle1·, especially a majority shareholder, has a right 
to sell his stock for whatever price he can get for it, 
and the fact that the price is more because of the 
fact that the sale of the stock is a sale of control will 
not give rise to a claim for relief. In Henn, Corpor-
ations, p. 384 ( 1961) it is observed: 
"Shareholders generally, except when 
they are subject to valid stock transfer re-
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strictions, may sell their shares for whatever 
price they can get, and a controlling block of 
shares as a practical matter usually can be 
sold at a higher price per share than other 
shares. The dilemna, arising from the rules 
that duties attach to the sale of control - on 
the theory that control is a corporate asset 
in which all shareholders have an equitable 
interest and are entitled to share - but not 
to the sale of the shares, is that a controlling 
block of shares cannot be severed from its 
appurtenant control and the price realized 
from the sale of such block cannot readily be 
allocated between the payment for such shares 
per se and any premium for appurtenant con-
trol." 
In 50 A.L.R. 2d 1148, it is obse1·ved: 
"Inhe1·ent in the very natm·e of stock 
corporations as constituted by our law are the 
settled principles that the shares of stock are 
the property of the stockholders, that the 
stockholdel'S may sell their shares when and 
to whom they please and for such price as 
they can get, that the purchase price paid 
upon such sales belongs to the sellers, and 
that these same rights exists even where the 
stockholders hold a majority of the stock and 
where the sellers are a group who together 
own and sell such a majority." 
Thus respondent had a perfect right to sell his shares 
and to obtain the full extrinsic value and worth of 
the shares including their value because of the fact 
they constituted majority control of the corporation. 
There are, of course, cases which recognize that a 
sale of control for the purposes of looting a corpora-
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tion 01· defrauding minority shareholders is action-
able, Gerdes vs. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 622 (Sup. 
Ct. N.Y. County 1941); lnsunrnshares vs. Northern 
Fiscol Col'p., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940), how-
eve1·, even in these cases it is recognized there may 
be a legitimate sale of control of a corporation and 
the receipt of a p1·emium. In the instant case there 
is no allegation of looting nor anything comparable 
to the facts of the Genies ancl Insunrnshares cases, 
nor could appellant so plead with candor. 
There is no doubt that c01·porate office may not 
be sold, iWcClHl'i vs. Lmc, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 
( 1899), hut sale of stock accompanied by the resig-
nation of office and the new control in the buyer is 
legal. EsseJ; lJnivel'sol Corp. i·s. Yotes, 305 F. 2d 
572 (2nd Cfr 1962); A1cCol'd vs. J1m·tin, 47 Cal. 
App. 717, 191 Pac. 89 ( 1920). 
In Esse.•; Universol Corp. vs. Yates, supra., 
Yates, the Chairman of Republic Pictures, entered 
into a contract to sell his shares in Republic Pictures 
Corp01·ation. He owned 28.3 c~ of the voting shares 
and received a premium of about $2,000,000 above 
the market price. The sale of the shares was to be 
accompanied by the resignation of various officials, 
thus transferring control. Yates subsequently re-
fused to cany out the transaction and Essex sued. 
Yates defended contending that the sale of control 
for a premium was illegal. The trial court granted 
summary judgment for Yates. On the appeal the 
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Second Circuit unanimously re\·ersed, 305 F. 2d 
572 (2nd Cir. 1962). Judge Lumbard found no 
illegality in the sale or the pre mi um, including the 
resignation of directol'S and officers (a factor not 
contracted for as alleged in the pleadings). He 
stated: 
"Essex was, however, contracting with 
Yates for the purchase of a \·ery substantial 
percentage of Republic stock. If, by ,·irtue of 
the \·oting power carried by this stock, it 
could have elected a majority of the board of 
directors then the contract was not a simple 
agreement for the sale of office to one having 
no ownership interest in the corporation, and 
the question of its legality would require fur-
ther analysis. Such stock \·oting control would 
incontestably belong to the owner of the ma-
jority of the voting stock, and it is commonly 
knO\vn that equfralent power usually accrues 
to the owner of 28.3 r ~ of the stock. 
* * * 
"There is no question of the right of a 
controller shareholder under New York law 
normally to derive a premium from the sale 
of a controlling block of stock. In other words, 
there was no impropriety per se in the fact 
that Yates was to receive more per share than 
the generally prevailing market price for Re-
public stock. Levy vs. American Beverage 
Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 218, 38 N. Y.S. 2d 
517 526 (1st Dept. 1942) ; Stanton vs. 
Schenck, 140 Misc. 621, 251 N.Y.S. 221 (N.Y. 
County Sup. Ct. 1931) ; see Hill, supra, 70 
Harv. L. Rev. at 991-92. 
"The next question is whether it is legal 
to gi,·e and receive payment for the immedi-
10 
ate transfe1· of management control to one 
who has achieved majority share control but 
would not otherwise be able to convert that 
shai·e control into operating control for some 
time. I think that it is." 
The court relied in part on Barnes vs. Brown, 
50 N.Y. 527 (1880) upholding the right to sell cor-
pm·ate conti·ol and i·eceive a premium if there were 
no scheme to loot or injm·e minority shareholders. 
J uclge Friendly, concurring noted: 
''Hence, I am inclined to think that if I 
were sitting on the New York Court of Ap-
peals, I \Vould hold a provision like Paragraph 
6 ,·iolative of public policy save when it was 
entirely plain that a new election would be a 
me1·e fo1·mality - i.e., when the seller owned 
more than 50' ~ of the stock." 
Even taking the more conservative view of 
.Judge Friendly the1·e is no basis f01· complaint in 
the instant case since the appellant alleges that re-
spondent owned 76.5 :~ of the shares of National 
Reliance. Therefore, Essex supports the trial court's 
ruling dismissing appellant's complaint. For a dis-
cussion of the Essex case clearly drawing the dis-
tinction between sales of majority conti·ol with pre-
mium, and sale of control for purposes which indi-
cate the buyer's intention to "loot" the corporation 
see Bayne, The Sale-Of-Confrol Quandry, 51 Cor-
nell Law Quarterly 49 ( 1965). The author's con-
clusions would support affirmance in this case. 
Numerous other cases have found the circum-
stances as alleged by the appellant insufficient to 
11 
grant recovery. In 111cCord vs. lVJartin, 47 Cal. App. 
717, 191 Pac. 89 ( 1920) the Secretary of a cor-
poration sold his shares for $15.00 per share if 
other shareholders sold their shares for $5.00 (a 
questionable condition not present here), even so, 
the appellant court found no improper action and 
ruled for defendant. 
A similar result was reached by the New J er-
sey Court in the case of a sale to a competitor in 
Keely vs. Black, 91 N.J.Eq. 520, Ill Atl. 22 ( 1920). 
The fact that sale of control may be made to a com-
petitor is not of consequence unless the sale creates 
a "void" in the market (a situation the court could 
take judicial notice did not occur in the insurance 
industry in Utah). Perlman vs. Feldnwnn, 219 F. 
2d 173 (2nd Cir. 1955). But in Essex Universal 
Corp. vs. Yates, supra, the court apparently com-
pletely discounted the fact of a possible transfer to 
a competitor. 
The New York Court in Levy vs. American 
Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S. 2cl 
517 ( 1942) noted that a claim that a majority 
shareholder made a sale of the control of the cor-
poration and received an amount in excess of the 
market value of his stock would not support recov-
ery. The court in deciding the matter spoke in terms 
very meaningful to the appellant's claim in this case. 
It stated: 
"The present case does not involve a 
charge that the majority stockholders bene-
12 
fited at the expense of the minority. That 
charge, howeve1·, i·ests solely on the claim that 
more was received by appellants for their stock 
than it was bringing in the open market. The 
difference between market price and liquidat-
ing value would indicate that the market 
price of small lots of stock did not reflect its 
intrinsic wm·th especially of controlling stock. 
Realization of more than the market price 
would not, unde1· such circumstances, be indi-
cative of fraud, nm· afford the minority stock-
holclel'S any i·ight of action. Nor would the 
fact that purchasers were willing to pay a 
la1·ge1· price to one holding control necessarily 
make the receipt of an increased price im-
proper or indicate any unlawful intention on 
the part of the purchasers. Control might 
hm'e lawful advantages. Fo1· instance, if cor-
porate control fo1· the purpose of merger, or 
some similar object, was desired by the pur-
chasers for legitimate purposes, undoubtedly 
they would pay more for a controlling inter-
est. \Ve see no reason why the value of control 
would not be a lawful property right of the 
controlling stockholders, at least to the extent 
that it is reflected in the price they may ob-
tain for their stock in an honest sale." 
In Tryon vs. Smith, 191 Ore. 172, 229 P. 2d 
251 ( 1951) an action was brought alleging "fraud" 
in the sale of shares of bank stock by the former 
president to a third-party corporation. The majority 
shareholders had sold the stock for more than the 
minority received and no disclosure of the difference 
was made. The Oregon Supreme Court sustained 
13 
the action for the defendants. In so holding the court 
observed: 
''It is generally held that majority stock-
holders may sell their stock at any time and 
for any price obtainable without informing 
other stockholders of the price or terms of 
sale, provided they act in good faith (citing 
many cases and au th01·i ties) . 
* * * 
"There being no fiduciary relationship 
existing between the stockholders of the bank 
so far as the sale of individual stock was con-
cerned, there was no duty upon the pa1·t of 
Smith to apprise minority stockholders of 
Transamerica's offer. The fact that Smith 
et.al. received more for their stock than the 
minority is no evidence of fraHd, since it is 
generally recognized that the stock of major-
ity stockholders is of m01·e value than that of 
the minority." 
Thus, the allegations of the appellant's petition 
really do not sustain the right to relief. 
The Arizona Supreme Court in Goode vs. Pozc-
ers, 97 Ariz. 75, 397 P. 2d 56 ( 1964) had occasion 
to consider a factual situation very similar to the 
Essex rule above and reached the same conclusion. 
The court held a contract for sale of control, with 
resignation of officers and granting of proxies plus 
a $500/$200 sale versus market price ratio gave no 
basis for relief. The court relied on the Oregon case 
in Tryon vs. Smith, supra, and ruled there was no 
cause of action on sale of control or the granting of 
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a premium. A similar result was reached in Levy 
vs. Arnerican Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 
38 N.Y.S. 2d 517 (1942). 
The appellant contends that Birnbaum vs. Unit-
ed States Steel, 193 F. 2d 461 (2nd Cir. 1952) and 
Palmcm vs. Feldnwnn, supra support this claim on 
appeal. 
The Birnbaum case was an action under Rule 
10 ( b )-5 similar to that brought by appellant in fed-
eral court in this case. Further the court did not in-
dicate in Birnbaum that a cause of action would be 
stated under New York law on the facts pleaded, but 
me1·ely dismissed the action under federal law find-
ing no fraud perpetrated on the purchaser or seller 
of securities as i·equired by 15 U.S.C. § 78 and Rule 
10 (b )-5. Further, the facts in Birnbaum show the 
corporate officers rejected a profitable transaction 
in favo1· of all stockholders in order to meet their 
own special interests. No such allegations are set 
nut in this case. 
The decision in Perlnwn vs. Feldmann, supra, 
is also inopposi te to the pleadings in this case. The 
decision is one involving the Birnham case and the 
sale of corporate control and looting of a steel com-
pany. It was decided by the United States Court of 
Appeals, Second Circuit under Indiana law. 1 The 
sale was by Feldmann, but he owned only 33 <;c of the 
'The court noted there was no Indiana case in point and so 
applied New York and other cases by analogy. 
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stock and a1Tangec1 for the transfer of 37 1, r of the 
stock gi,·ing minority ownership, a fact not present 
in this case. Furthe1·, the transfer "closed" the 
market during a time of market shortage of steel 
thus giving the receiving company a monopolistic 
position. No allegations of a like nature ai·e made 
in this case. Indeed life insurance is a commodity 
where the industi·y is in open competition in Utah. 
Further, Feldmann transferred the stock in the face 
of another possible merger that would have benefit-
ed all shareholders. A simple reading of the case 
against the complaint and allied evidence before this 
court demonstrates its inapplicability. 
Further, subsequent to Perlman the Second 
Circuit has reti·eated from its position, Essr:e [!ni-
versal Corp. vs. Yates, supra, which may be because 
New York and other state courts have seemed to 
feel that absent the special facts extant in Feldmmrn 
the sale of control for a premium is not per se bad. 
Bemori vs. Brcrnn, 155 N.Y.S. 2d 622 (1956). 
In Newman and Pickering, A Pre1nimn for 
Control, 28 Texas Bar Journal 735, 781 (1965) it is 
observed: 
"Some of the writers who have argued 
for per se liability have cited Perlman vs. 
Feldmann as the primary authority for their 
position. The more recent Essex decision by 
the Second Circuit, however, repudiates this 
view. Moreover, in all of the simple sales cases 
where liability has been found, the selling 
stockholder, knew or should have known that 
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after the sale the c01·pora tion or the other 
stockholders would suffer more detriment 
that they probably would not otherwise have 
incurred." 
In Ryder vs. Hamburger, 172 Cal. 791, 158 Pac. 
753 ( 1916) the California court held no cause of 
action shown for sale, rnerge1·, and control with a 
premium to Hamburger on the sale of Salt Lake 
Oil Company. The facts are comparable to those 
pleaded here. Utah law was apparently applicable 
without specific p1·ecedent being found to govern. 
Another case that supports the trial court's action 
here is Keely vs. Black, 91 N.J.Eq. 520, 111 Atl. 22 
(N.J. Ct. Errors & App. 1920). Also it should be 
noted that since the appellant claimed a cause of 
action based on the breach of a fiduciary duty tanta-
mount to fraud he had the obligation to plead with 
pa1·ticularity. Rule 9 (b) U.R.C.P. provides in part: 
"In all averments of fraud or mistake, 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mis-
take shall be stat€d with particularity." 
The1·ef ore, the trial court could, in weighing wheth-
er a claim was in fact stated, look at the actual facts 
pleaded as distinct from the conclusions. In this case 
they show no more than a mere sale of control for 
a premium. 
It is submitted the court correctly ruled that 
appellant had not stated a claim for relief. 
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POINT II 
THE ACTION IN THE TRIAL COURT \VAS 
RES JUDI CAT A. 
The Appellant, Robert I. Cohne, filed a suit in 
the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah on August 5, 1965, against the respondent and 
others, including Investors and National Western, 
mentioned in the appellant's present complaint. The 
same allegations of ownership and control of stock 
were made against the respondent. Appellant also 
purported to represent a class, and also to bring a 
derivative action for National Reliance, the same as 
was done in this case. Jurisdiction of Count I was 
based on 15 U.S.C., Sec. 78j; Sec. lOb of the Secur-
ities and Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule lOb-5. 
The same essential allegations raised in Count I of 
the federal complaint are now raised in Count I of 
the appellant's complaint before this court. Count 
II of the federal complaint was essentially the same 
action as Count II of the present action and pur-
ported to be brought under Rule 23 (b) F.R.C.P. 
Therefore, the federal action was essentially the 
same action except that the appellant relied on the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for jurisdiction 
and the legal framework of the cause of action. Rule 
lOb-5 makes actionable the use of any "device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud," or "to engage in 
any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
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any security." The legal framework of the rule was 
comparable to the common law basis of the appel-
lant's present action. 
Subsequent to the filing of the initial complaint 
in federal court, appellant filed an amended com-
plaint alleging the same legal basis for jurisdiction 
but also claiming the respondent's acts to give rise 
"pendent to claims arising under and based solely" 
on Rule lOb-5. Thus, appellant initially invoked the 
''pendent" jurisdiction of the federal court. On 
March 7, 1966, appellant expressly waived any pen-
dent claims in federal court and that portion of the 
amended complaint was striken. :! The amended com-
plaint purp01·ted to raise the same general issues 
but was framed in the nature of a conspiracy com-
plaint. After substantial argument on the question 
of the court's jurisdiction and whether a claim for 
relief was stated, the Honorable A. Sherman Chris-
tensen, Judge, entered a memorandum decision on 
July 6, 1966. He concluded: 
"I have concluded, in view of the cases 
cited by counsel in the briefs and in reason-
able interpretation of the statute, that there 
can be no recovery under the allegations of 
the complaint of a premium on profits from a 
sale of control; that a sufficient 10 (b) claim 
is not stated; that there is no reliance shown 
by any purchaser or seller of any security or 
' Contrary to the implication in appellant's brief the court 
did not strike the pendent claims on its own finding but 
did so only after an express waiver of those claims by ap-
pellant's counsel. 
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in connection with a pm·chase 01· sale; that 
the merger as pleaded is not a sale, nor was 
it effected in connection with a sale of secur-
ities within the contemplation of the statute, 
and that the theory of fraud in connection 
with proxy solicitations does not sustain 
plaintiff's claims as stated." 
On September 22, 1966, the federal court enter-
ed a final order dismissing the appellant's com-
plaint. The order recited: 
"That plaintiff's Amended Complaint 
and the above entitled action and all claims 
for relief asserted therein be and the same 
hereby are dismissed on the grounds and for 
the reasons that plaintiff's Amended Com-
plaint fails to state facts upon which the re-
lief demanded can be granted and this court 
is without jurisdiction of the subject matter 
set forth therein, all in accordance with the 
Memorandum Decision he1·etofore made ancl 
ente1·ed herein." 
It should be noted that the memorandum de-
cision of the court found no claim stated "under the 
allegations of the complaint of a premium on profits 
for sale of control." Further, the order dismissed be-
cause no claim was stated. 
The respondent submits the federal action is 
now res judicata. The contention is based on two 
theories. First, that since the federal court found 
the facts pleaded in the federal action to state no 
basis for relief under a theory of premium of con-
trol, that determination of law when coupled with 
the order dismissing for failure to state a claim in 
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addition to jm·isdiction settled the "law of the case" 
between the parties on the facts alleged and hence 
no claim for relief is stated under this complaint. 
The Restatenient of Judgnients, Sec. 70 observes: 
"\Vhere a question of law essential to the 
judgment is actually litigated and determined 
by a valid and final personal judgment, the 
determination is not conclusive between the 
parties in a subsequent action on a different 
cause of action, except where both causes of 
action arose out of the same subject matter 
or transaction .... " 
In this case, as noted above, the claim of appel-
lant arises out of the same transaction and is there-
fore baned. 
Comment b. to the above section of the Restate-
ment notes, p. 320: 
"\\'here a question of law is actually liti-
gated and determined in an action, the deter-
mination is ordinarily conclusive between the 
parties in a subsequent action involving the 
same subject matter or transaction, although 
based upon a different cause of action from 
that upon which the original action was bas-
ed." 
It is, therefore, submitted the action should be 
deemed res judicata. 
The second, and more primary theory upon 
which respondent claims the cause of action to be 
barred is based upon the contention that if appel-
lant had a claim for i·elief against the respondent 
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under state law at the time of the federal action it 
could have been sustained under the court's pendent 
jm·isdiction, and having expressly waived any pen-
dent claims in that action the appellant may not now 
maintain this case in Utah courts. 
This requires first an appreciation of federal 
pendent jurisdiction. In Osborn vs. Bank of United 
States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204 ( 1824) the 
United States Supreme Court recognized that where 
a federal question is raised under the judicial auth-
ority of the United States, the federal court would 
necessarily have the power to decide the whole cause 
even though non-federal issues were presented. 
The Osborn decision was "expanded" in Silel' 
vs. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 
( 1909). In that case the court observed: 
"The Federal questions as to the inYa-
lidi ty of the state statute because, as alleged, 
it was in violation of the Federal Constitu-
tion, gave the circuit court jurisdiction and, 
having properly obtained it, that court had 
the right to decide all the questions in the 
case, even though it decided the Federal ques-
tions adversely to the party raising them, or 
even if it omitted to decide them at all, but 
decided the case on local or state questions 
only." 
Thus, the court seems clearly to recognize that 
a state issue clearly tied into the federal issue could 
be decided even if the federal issue were not decided 
or decided adversely to the party. In the instant case 
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the federal basis of jurisdiction and the claim for 
relief were expressly decided adverse to the appel-
lant and appellant had originally pleaded the con-
tention that the claims were at least supportable as 
pendent claims under state law. This basis was, 
thereafter, expressly waived by the appellant. Hence, 
he could have maintained the action under the pen-
dent power of the federal court and elected not to 
do so. That election now precludes the action in this 
co mt 
\Vright, Federal Com· ts, p. 56 ( 1963) it is ob-
se1Ted: 
"In fact the state regulation was held 
invalid on state grounds, and the court de-
clared this preferable to an unnecessary de-
termination of federal constitutional ques-
tions. This rule, that the federal court need 
not, and perhaps should not, decide the fed-
eral issue but may resolve the case entirely 
on state grounds is not, as the Osborn rule 
was, a rule of necessity. It is, however, a use-
ful rule. It avoids decision of constitutional 
questions where possible, and it permits one 
lawsuit, rather than two, to resolve the entire 
controversy." 
Appellant consequently had full opportunity to 
have the issue decided as a pendent issue in the 
federal action. 
In Hurn vs. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), the 
Supreme Court again observed as to pendent jur-
isdiction: 
"But the rule does not go so far as to 
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permit a ferleral court to assume jurisdiction 
of a separate and distinct non-federal cause 
of action because it is joined in the same com-
plaint with a federal cause of action. The dis-
tinction to be observed is between a case where 
two distinct grounds in support of a single 
cause of action are alleged, one only of which 
presents a federal question, and a case where 
two separate and distinct causes of action are 
alleged, one only of which is federal in char-
acter. In the former, where the federal ques-
tion averred is not plainly wanting in sub-
stance, the federal court, even though the fed-
eral ground be not established may neverthe-
less retain and dispose of the case upon the 
non-federal ground; in the latter it may not 
do so upon the non-federal cause of action." 
The instant claim of violation of state law was 
based on the same facts claimed to violate federal 
law, and hence, was not a "separate and distinct" 
claim for relief. The federal trial court, therefore, 
had jurisdiction to settle the claim of state law vio-
lating arising from the same facts, and at least had 
discretion to hear the matter. Note Discretionary 
Federal Jurisdiction Over the Pendent Cause, 46 
Ill. L. Rev. 646 ( 1951). Appellant abandoned the 
opportunity for federal pendent jurisdiction and, 
thus, abandoned its opportunity to have the state 
claim decided in the first action. This is res judicata 
under Utah law. 
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In East Mill Creek Water Co. vs. Salt Lake 
City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P. 2d 863 ( 1952) the Utah 
Supreme Court observed: 
" * * * there a1·e two kinds of cases where 
the doctrine of res judicata is applied: In the 
one former action is an absolute bar to the 
maintenance of the second; it usually bars 
the successful party as well as the loser; it 
must be between the same parties or their 
privies; it applies not only to points and is-
sues which are actually raised and decided 
therein but also to such as could have been 
therein adjudicated, but it only applies where 
the claim, demand or cause of action is the 
same in both cases. In such case the court's 
hold that the parties should litigate their en-
tire claim, demand and cause of action, and 
every party, issue and ground thereof, and if 
one of the parties fails to raise any point or 
issue or to litigate any part of his claim, de-
mand or cause of action and the matter goes 
to final judgment, such party may not again 
litigate that claim, demand or cause of action 
or any issue, point or part thereof which he 
could have but failed to litigate in the former 
action. On the other hand where the claim, 
demand or cause of action is different in the 
two cases then the former is res judicata of 
the latter only to the extent that the former 
actually raised and decided the same points 
and issues which are raised in the latter." 
In Wheadon vs. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 
P. 2d 946 (1962) an action was brought to estab-
lish a right of way by implied easement. A previous 
action had been brought on the theory of prescrip-
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tive easement. The Utah Court held the second ac-
tion was res judicata since the appellant could have 
raised the issue in the first action. The court cited 
the East Mill Creek Water case and stated: 
"We believe that the above-quoted state-
ment supports the rule of the lower court. 
Here, we have the same parties litigating the 
same subject matter - an asserted right of 
way over defendants' property. While plain-
tiff's endeavored to establish this right of way 
by prescriptive easement in the first action, 
the issue or theory of implied easement, now 
urged in this second action, could have been 
urged and adjudicated in the first action. 
This is particularly true under our Rules of 
Civil Procedure which expressly permits hrn 
or more statements of a claim. 
"Policy would seem to indicate that when 
a plaintiff has once attempted to obtain his 
entire relief, based upon his entire claim, then 
the matter should be laid at rest. He should 
be denied a second attempt at substantially 
the same objective under a different guise." 
Since appellant herein had every opportunity 
to assert the same claim he now urges at the time 
the case was in federal court because of the court's 
pendent jurisdiction, and having expressly waived 
the pendent claim, no action may now be maintained. 
Supporting this conclusion is Jocie Motor Lines, Inc. 
vs. Johnson, 231 N.C. 367, 57 S.E. 2d 388 (1950); 
Horne vs. Woolever, 170 Ohio St. 178, 163 N.E. 2cl 
378 ( 1959). In each case the court found the plain-
tiff had an action it could have asserted in federal 
26 
coud and didn't. The courts ruled the action in state 
court barred. 
The appellant attemps to draw a distinction 
between pendent substantive jurisdiction and pen-
dent procedural jurisdiction based on the extraterri-
t01·ial process allowed in suit brought for violations 
of Rule lOb-5 (Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa). Appellant re-
lies upon Trussell vs. United Underivriters, Ltd. 
286 F. Supp. 801 (D.C. Colo. 1964). The Trussell 
case does draw such a distinction, but it still affords 
the appellant no relief. First other lower federal 
com·ts have taken the opposite view. 
In Cooper vs. North Jersey Trust Company, 226 
F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), Judge Feinberg had 
a situation comparable to the situation as this case 
existed when it was before Judge Christensen. 
Claims were based on Rule lOb-5 and also on a pen-
dent state basis. A motion to dismiss the state 
claims on the theory of pendent jurisdiction because 
it was an attempt to secure not substantive jurisdic-
tion but procedural jm·iscliction by non-resident ser-
vice. The Court stated: 
"Having dealt with defendant's attacks 
on plaintiff's claims which are concededly 
federal in nature, the next most important 
issue raised by the motion to dismiss is whe-
ther this Court has acquired personal juris-
diction over Trust Co. with regard to the non-
federal theories for relief. There is no dispute 
that the only service made upon Trust Co. 
was extra-territorial service in New Jersey 
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under Section 27 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. 
The question raised is whether such service 
gives the Court personal jurisdiction over 
Trust Co. to grant the relief sought under 
the non-security act legal theories for relief 
- the claims alleging conversion, breach of 
fiduciary duty and negligence. The District 
Courts which have considered this question 
appear to be in disagreement though the ma-
jority of these decisions deny such jurisdic-
tion. International Ladies' Garment Workers' 
Union vs. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145 
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Kappus vs. \"\'estern Hills 
Oil, Inc., 24 F.R.D. 123 (E.D.Wis. 1959); 
J aypen Holdings, Ltd. vs. Bellanca Corp., 22 
F.R.D. 190 (D.N.J. 1958); Lasch vs. Antkies, 
161 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Pa.1958). Cases in-
dicating that such jurisdiction is proper are: 
Townsend Corp. of America vs. Davidson, 
222 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.J. 1963); Collings vs. 
Bush Mfg. Co., 19 F.R.D. 297 (S.D.N.Y 
1956) (dictum) ; Stella \·s. Kaiser, 82 F. 
Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (without discus-
sion). If service of Trust Co. were properly 
made, the Court would have subject matter 
jurisdiction to grant the relief sought after 
trial on the non-federal legal theories under 
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, since all 
of the claims here are but different theories 
for relief for violation of a single right. Hurn 
vs. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 53 S. Ct. 586, 77 
L. Ed. 1148 (1933); Brown vs. Bullock, 194 
F. Supp. 207, 220 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F. 
2d 415 (2 Cir. 1961) ; International Ladies' 
Garment Workers' Union vs. Shields & Co., 
supra at 147-48 of 209 F. Supp. 
"The reasons of judicial economy -
which justify the judicially created doctrine 
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of pendent jm·isdiction - suggest sustain-
ing the service of process as to the pendent 
non-federal claims. See Note, 63 Colum. L. 
Rev. 762 ( 1963). The same basic facts will 
have to be presented on both federal and non-
federal theories. Service on the federal claims 
is proper and defense of these claims must, 
in any event be made in this District. 
"The Court of Appeals for this circuit 
had occasion to consider this problem in 
Schwartz vs. Eaton, 264 F. 2d 195 (2 Cir. 
1959). Suit in the District Court was brought 
for violation of the Investment Company Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-52, as well as on non-
f ederal grounds. The lower court struck from 
the complaint the non-federal theories of re-
covery and quashed service of process as to 
them, holding that service pursuant to a stat-
ute authorizing nationwide service does not 
give personal jurisdiction over a defendant so 
served upon pendent theories for recovery. 
Schwartz vs. Bowman, 156 F. Supp. 361, 
364-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). An appeal from this 
order of the District Court was dismissed for 
lack of finality. 264 F. 2d at 196. However, 
the Court of Appeals wrote that (264 F. 2d at 
197-98): 
'[f] rom every angle the district 
court's action in attempting to dismiss 
a part of plaintiff's legal theories ap-
pears a nullity. The striking of a por-
tion of the prayer for relief was surely 
a futile and meaningless gesture. F.R. 
54 ( c) * * And the trial judge at the 
close of the case will still be obligated 
to grant the parties the relief to which 
they prove themselves entitled. * * So 
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every consideration of trial conven-
ience for litigants and courts accords 
with the legal principle pointing to a 
complete determination of this contro-
versy at one time.' 
'\Ve add that we can perceive no 
additional hardship upon the defen-
dants here in expecting them to defend 
their actions against claims of violation 
of state law, as well as for rescission 
under the federal statute.' 
"Judge Moore concurred in the result, 
but dissented as to the view that the lower 
court had personal jurisdiction to decide the 
non-federal theories. 
"In an opinion subsequent to Schwartz, 
Judge Dimock, the author of Schwartz in the 
District Court, has reiterated his views. In-
ternational Ladies' Garment Workers' Union 
vs. Shields & Co., supra. Holding that there 
was pendent subject matter jurisdiction over 
the non-federal theories, the Court, in dis-
tinguishing pendent subject matter jurisdic-
tion from pendent personal jurisdiction, stat-
ed that the former "flows of necessity from 
the conception that there is but a single claim 
where a single right has been violated." 209 
F. Supp at 148. However, the fact that there 
is a single claim does not foreclose separate 
trial on rights to relief created by different 
sovereigns in the courts of those sovereigns. 
Interpreting Schwartz as meaning that the 
action of the District Court was not effective 
in foreclosing relief on the non-federal theory, 
the Court in International Ladies' Garment 
Workers' Union stated that the issue can be 
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limited in the pre-trial order as whether there 
was a violation only of the federal law. 
"With all i·espect, I must disagree. Al-
though the Comt in Schwartz indicated as 
one of its grounds of disapproval of the action 
in the lower court that full relief must be 
granted even though not asked for [Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 54 ( c)], its objection to the disposi-
tion of the issue of pendent personal jurisdic-
tion cannot be cured merely by the device of 
a pre-trial order. Although much of Schwartz 
is concededly dictum, the Court indicated that 
it felt adjudication of the non-federal claims 
is proper. This is clearly indicated by the dis-
cussion of hardship and judicial convenience. 
Judge Moore's opinion interpreted the lan-
guage of the majority to mean this. 
"In the present state of the law, I am in-
clined to follow the dictum in Schwartz be-
cause ( 1) it indicates the feeling of the Cir-
cuit Court, and (2) it conforms with the in-
terests of justice in avoiding piece-meal liti-
gation. In this respect, the Court notes that 
the new amendments to Rule 4 (f), Fed. R. 
Civ. P. reflect the policy of judicial economy 
at the sacrifice of state borders. 
"Accordingly, insofar as the motion to 
dismiss alleges lack of personal jurisdiction 
over the non-federal claims, it will be denied." 
It should be noted that the only appellate auth-
ority would be contrary to the position urged by the 
respondent. In addition it is questionable if Judge 
Fienberg's "case counting" is accurate. See 5 ALR 
3rd 1057. Further, the reasoning of the legal schol-
ars seems to support the Fienberg thesis of assum-
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ing pendent jurisdiction in such cases. 63 Col. L. 
Rev. 762 (1963); 72 Har. L. Rev. 773 (1959); 51 
Iowa L. Rev. 151 ( 1965) ; 107 Pa. L. Rev. 714 
(1959). However, this court need not decide be-
tween competing federal courts since in this case the 
same issue was involved in the federal and pendent , 
claims and appellant waived the state claim in fed-
eral court. In Trussell, Judge Doy le had observed: 
"We are not persuaded by these reasons 
because we do not agree that quashing the 
service of process for the pendent claims will 
necessarily require relitigation in another 
court of the same issues which will have been 
litigated in this Court. Since the same ques-
tions of fact between the same parties are in-
volved, collateral estoppel should make a mere 
formality of a separate suit on the pendent 
claims. Myers vs. International Trust Co., 
263 U.S. 64, 44 S. Ct. 86, 68 L. Ed. 165 
( 1923); Partmar Corp. vs. Paramount Pic-
tures Theatres Corp., 347 U.S. 89, 74 S. Ct. 
414, 98 L. Ed 532 ( 1954) ." 
Judge Doyle was not faced at his level with a 
complete waiver of the pendent claims which is what 
occurred in the federal court in this case. Further, 
in Judge Christensen's Comt the whole attack was 
on the substantive issue. If the pendent claims had 
not been waived they could have been litigated on 
their merits, if any. By first abandoning the alleged 
cause and now attempting to resurrect it in the state 
court the circuity of litigation. Judge Fienberg's 
ruling, and that of the Second Circuit, Schwartz vs. 
Eaton, 264 F. 2d 195 (2nd Cir. 1957), would cure 
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has occured. In such a case the 10th Circuit has in-
dicated the pa1·ty who abandoned the action is bar-
red. In Crist vs. United Underwriters, 343 F. 2d 902 
(10th Cir. 1965) it was observed (after Trussell) : 
"The complaint also alleges a cause of 
action based on the Kansas "Blue Sky Law" 
(§§ 17-1253, 17-1254, 17-1255, 17-1258, 1959 
Supp. Kan. Gen. Stats. 1949). This act ex-
pressly provides a cause of action to a pur-
chaser of securities under stated circum-
stances. From the record it appears that a 
motion is pending to dismiss this cause of 
action, but on this appeal the cause is still in 
the case. The appallents have taken the ap-
peal and presented the case entirely on the 
federal cause of action and no other. If there 
was any basis to support the writs on the 
cause of action based on the Kanas statutes, 
it has been waived by the parties and need not 
be he1·e considered." 
Since appellant expressly waived his state claim 
he is barred from now reasserting it in state court 
and the trial court properly so ruled below. 
If this court should decide to view the matter 
on the issue of the full extent of pendent jurisdic-
tion the trial court's ruling based on Hurn vs. Ours-
ler, supra is the proper ruling to avoid piece-meal 
litigation. See also case recognizing pendent juris-
diction of state claims in Federal Securities Act 
suits, 5 ALR 3rd§ 26, p. 1115 and§ 4 p. 1057. The 
appellant should not be allowed to have his cake 
here after having ate it in federal court. 
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POINT III 
APPELLANT IS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED 
TO BRING THIS ACTION. 
The appellant's action below was the same as he 
brought in federal court. Judge Christensen found 
the facts stated no claim for relief under Rule lOb-.) 
or § 10 ( b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934. He 
found no action was stated under the "Complaint of 
a premium on profits from sale of control; that a 
sufficient lO(b) claim is not stated; that there is no 
i·eliance shown ... " 
It may be assumed that an action unde1· Rule 
lOb-.~ may vary to some degree from the common 
law fraud action they no\v seek under the guise of 
sale of control. Howe,·er, the elements of the two 
actions ai·e similar in several instances and the 
lOb-5 rule is less rigid. Thus, if appellant could not 
plead an action under Rule lOb-5 they could not sus-
tain a common law fraud action. Compare Stevens 
vs. Vowells, 343 F. 37 4 (10th Cir. 1965) with 
Stucki vs. Delta Land and Wate1· Co., 63 Utah 495, 
227 Pac. 971 ( 1924). 
Judge Christensen ruled no claim for relief 
under the pleaded facts on a theory of premium of 
control. The facts there pleaded are the full facts 
that the appellant may rely on to support his con-
tentions. \\1hen these facts, as noted above, are sep-
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arated from the conclusionary pleading, they do not 
support a cause of action under the theory of pre-
mium of control or common law fraud. This is what 
Judge Christensen in part ruled. In the Restate-
ment of Judgments, Sec. 68, Comment f., it is ob-
served: 
"If a question of fact is put in issue by 
the pleadings, and at the trial the fact is ad-
mitted and in consequence no proof is offered 
by the party having the burden of proof, the 
question is litigated and a judgment is con-
clusive between the parties as to the ques-
tions." 
The facts of appellant's complaint have been 
admitted for purposes of respondent's motions to 
dismiss the matter submitted on the pleadings and 
the federal court finding no basis for a claim, the 
appellant is estopped to proceed in this action. 
Nor can it be said that the federal court ruled 
merely that it had no jurisdiction. A simple reading 
of the memorandum decision of Judge Christensen 
and the final order in the context of the briefs sub-
mitted makes clear he went beyond that basis. Even 
so the facts pleaded and found insufficient result in 
a bar to the same facts being pleaded in this case 
to support a claim for relief similar in nature but 
requiring an even greater burden. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant seeks two bites at the same apple, 
and a bad apple at that. His complaint failed to 
state a claim for relief as has been clearly shown. 
Second, he expressly waived the same cause of ac-
tion in federal court as he now seeks to maintain. 
To now allow such action is contrary to sound ju-
dicial administration since it promotes multiple and 
circuiteous litigation. It is submitted the trial court 
correctly dismissed the litigation and this court 
should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Respondent 
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